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MOVE-AWAY CUSTODY DISPUTES: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS &
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
Jen has physical custody of her two young children. She
was a homemaker during her former marriage and now
wishes to attend a university so she may begin a career. Her
mother will watch the children if Jen returns to school in Illi-
nois. Jen believes the transition will be positive because her
children will be raised in the presence of her family. Her ex-
husband, however, wants to be able to visit his children. He is
seeking a modification of the existing custody order to transfer
physical custody of the children to him, or to force Jen to re-
main in California.
Laura lives in San Francisco with her ten-year-old son
and has a career in business. Laura and her ex-husband,
Dan, were married for twelve years. Laura has been offered a
promotion in Los Angeles. The new job will advance Laura in
her career and increase her salary significantly. The higher
income will enable her to place her son in a private school and
begin a savings account for his college education. Dan does
not want Laura to relocate because he does not have the time
nor money to travel regularly to Los Angeles to visit his son.
Dan has requested a modification of the initial custody decree
to have his son placed in his physical custody.
How should the court rule in these situations? There is
no predictable answer for either scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of post-divorce relocation disputes, known
as "move-away" cases in family law parlance, has become a
pressing and important issue in the United States.' The
prevalence of move-away disputes stems from a variety of
sources. First, as increasing numbers of women enter the la-
bor force,2 the equation of women and work has become a so-
1. In re Marriage of McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182 (Ct. App. 1992).
2. For the time period of 1983 to 1991, the increase in the proportion of
women working full-time is statistically significant. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
sus, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 412 (1992).
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cial norm. The increase of women in the work force results
from both single and divorced women3 needing employment
for financial sustenance, as well as their wish to follow career
goals. Often, women place great emphasis on their employ-
ment and must relocate to find work or to promote their edu-
cation and careers.'
The problem of relocation instigated by the need to ob-
tain employment is not unique to women. According to the
California Court of Appeal:
In these days of each parent pursuing a career, advance-
ment up the career ladder may require a parent to move
to a different community or, indeed, to a different part of
the country.... Such a parent must give serious consider-
ation to moves which are best for career advancement,
since careers continue long past the minority of children
and are important for the financial and psychological well-
being of the parent.5
This statement suggests that social conditions often force
both men and women to relocate in order to find employment
that will permit them to support both themselves and their
children at an acceptable standard of living.
Second, economic needs and incentives frequently make
employment a top priority for both men and women. Reloca-
tion may be necessary in order to take advantage of job oppor-
tunities in distant locations,6 or to pursue economic stability
through residence in areas with lower housing costs. Thus, it
is becoming more common for custodial parents to plan to
relocate with their children to an area that is no longer
within the same jurisdiction as the noncustodial parent.7
This situation is especially true because technology has made
travel, and thus relocation, a much easier endeavor than it
3. Research results have indicated that "75% of custodial mothers move at
least once within four years after separation or divorce." DAVID ROBERTI, SEN-
ATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, REPORT ON FAMILY LAW: RELOCATION OF CUSTO-
DIAL PARENTS at 4 (1994) (on file with author).
4. See infra note 6.
5. In re Marriage of Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 259 (Ct. App. 1986).
6. "Since 1985 nearly half of all households in the U.S. have moved. Each
year, 11.5 million children between the ages of 1 and 17 change residences.
Corporate transfers send over half a million children into new homes."
ROBERTI, supra note 3, at 4.
7. See generally Peter T. Surace, Note, A Proposed "Best Interests" Test for
Removing a Child from the Jurisdiction of the Noncustodial Parent, 51 FORD-
HAM L. REIEW 489, 495-501 (1982).
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was in the past. As a result, move-away custody cases repre-
sent an important and pervasive problem in the area of fam-
ily law.
Typically, in move-away cases the original custody order
gives physical custody to one parent,8 referred to as the "cus-
todial" parent, while the other parent is granted visitation
rights.9 In a move-away situation, at some point following
marital dissolution, the parent with physical custody wishes
to relocate either to a different county or state. The noncus-
todial parent will usually contest the proposed modification,
arguing that such a relocation is inequitable and will frus-
trate or completely prevent the noncustodial parent from ex-
ercising his visitation rights.1"
To resolve such disputes, the court must address the di-
lemma of competing parental needs and interests, while
viewing the best interests of the child1" as the paramount
concern. In essence, the trial court judge must determine
which parent's relationship with the child is to receive prior-
ity and be designated the custodial relationship.
Currently, the court has no standard or legislative guide-
lines for addressing the competing interests and factors in-
herent in move-away custody cases. Judges must resolve
such custody disputes on a case-by-case basis. 2 Resolving
move-away custody disputes using case-by-case analysis is a
challenging judicial endeavor because there are three consid-
erations in a move-away situation: the child, the custodial
8. Although the California Family Code has no gender preference as to
which parent should receive primary custody of the child, the mother is
predominantly granted physical custody, while the father is granted reasonable
visitation rights. Furthermore, this is an arrangement to which the parents of
a child often stipulate. Thus, for the purposes of this comment, the custodial,
moving parent will be referred to as female and the noncustodial parent with
visitation rights will be referred to as male. The author's choice of gender refer-
ence is not intended to be sexist in any way. See generally In re Marriage of
Roe, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 352, 353 (Ct. App. 1993), review granted and cause trans-
ferred sub nom. by In re Marriage of Clinton H.R., 856 P.2d 1131 (Cal. 1993),
aff'd sub nom.,In re Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993); In re
Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 840, 842 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Marriage of
Fingert, 271 Cal. Rptr. 389, 390 (Ct. App. 1990); Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 254;
In re Marriage of Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 79 (Ct. App. 1980); In re Marriage of
Ciganovich, 132 Cal. Rptr. 261, 262 (Ct. App. 1976).
9. See generally cases cited supra note 8.
10. See discussion infra part II.C.4.
11. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 1994).
12. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
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move-away parent, and the remaining noncustodial parent
all have competing interests and needs. 13 Therefore, the pri-
mary issue posed by the three competing interests is as fol-
lows: How can and should a family law judge resolve a di-
lemma that pits the child's best interests against concerns of
parental and personal autonomy?
Although a case-by-case approach enables judges to con-
sider the facts and circumstances of each situation, the flexi-
bility of this approach is not without serious disadvantages.
Without legislative standards or an explicit framework to fol-
low, the judge resolving a move-away custody dispute is
vested with essentially unbridled discretion.14 The "best-in-
terests-of-the-child" 5 standard fails to provide judges with
effective guidelines that guarantee objective decisions. Thus,
judges can use virtually any factors to decide move-away cus-
tody cases, including personal evaluations and subjective
preferences. 16 As a result, judicial decisions in move-away
custody cases lack uniformity and predictability.
Because explicit guidelines do not exist to aid judges in
the resolution of move-away custody disputes, it is apparent
that they have relied upon developing trends and case law. A
historical overview of the treatment of these disputes is help-
ful in tracing such informal trends and identifying the foun-
dation of current public policy goals.
The reader should note, however, that while trends may
provide rudimentary guidelines for judges to solve move-
away custody disputes, current standards remain inadequate
due to their lack of uniformity and unpredictability. As such,
these informal trends and preliminary guidelines require
transformation into explicit, legislative guidelines. This com-
ment's primary focus is to propose legislative guidelines to fill
the existing gaps, thereby lending uniformity and consistency
to the determination of move-away custody disputes.
13. See generally Surace, supra note 7, at 496; Janet Bulow & Steven G.
Gellman, Note, The Judicial Role in Post-Divorce Child Relocation Controver-
sies, 35 STAN. L. REV. 949, 950-54 (1982). See also discussion infra part II.B.2.
14. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3040(b) (West 1994).
15. Id. § 3011. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
16. In Speelman v. Super. Ct., 199 Cal. Rptr. 784 (Ct. App. 1983), the trial
court judge maintained: "'Frankly, I'm not too much in favor of a military up-
bringing for a child and-of this age .... I think that-he has a better opportu-
nity here in California than he has in-than he had in Massachusetts at the
moment.'" Id. at 786 (alteration in original).
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In Section II, this comment traces the development of in-
formal trends that emerged from the 1950's onward which
serve as rudimentary guidelines in the resolution of move:-
away custody cases."7 In addition, current goals and public
policy principles of family law, 18 as well as critical factors
that aid in the determination of such disputes,19 will be ex-
amined and analyzed in Section II. Section II will also ad-
dress constitutional issues that surface when requested modi-
fication of custody orders is denied thereby restricting
relocation.2 0 Section III addresses the need for a legislative
approach for solving these disputes as they become increas-
ingly common and complex.21 Finally, Section IV proposes a
flexible framework of rules to serve as a legislative scheme to
assist in more consistent and efficient judicial resolution of
move-away custody cases. 22
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Overview of the Treatment of Move-Away
Custody Cases
1. Tender Years Doctrine
Prior to the enactment of California Family Code section
3040(a)(1), which mandates that California courts "shall not
prefer a parent as custodian because of that parent's sex,"23
the court followed a policy referred to as the "tender years"
doctrine in awarding custody.24 In general, this doctrine es-
tablished a presumption that children of "tender years" be
placed under the primary custody of the mother.25 The appli-
cation of this doctrine is exemplified in White v. White,26 in
which the California Court of Appeal complied with Califor-
nia Civil Code section 138(2), now repealed, which read in
part as follows:
17. See infra text accompanying notes 74-248.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 51-74.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 54-235.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 237-54.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 255-80.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 281-90. See also infra note 275.
23. CAL. F m. CODE § 3040(a)(1) (West 1994).
24. White v. White, 240 P.2d 1015, 1015 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
25. Id.
26. 240 P.2d 1015 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
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As between parents adversely claiming the custody,
neither parent is entitled to it as of right; but other things
being equal, if the child is of tender years, it should be
given to the mother; if it is of an age to require education
and preparation for labor and business, then to the
father.
2 7
Thus, in the past, custody decisions were more simplistic
because the award of custody was based upon the age of the
child. The court did not have to analyze and evaluate factors
regarding the nature and quality of the relationship between
the child and each parent.
Consequently, once the court made a determination that
a child should be placed in the primary custody of the mother,
it was easier for the court to allow custodial mothers to relo-
cate, even out of state.2" This apparent ease 29 in allowing re-
location as a general rule also stemmed from the fact that
parenting was not considered a joint endeavor as it is today;30
it was traditionally viewed as primarily the mother's respon-
sibility. Thus, deference was often given to the mother's con-
cerns because she was the primary caretaker. 3
2. Judicial Limitations on Granting Modifications in
Move-Away Custody Cases
Although courts appeared to take a lenient stance in per-
mitting relocation, they did set limitations on the custodial
parent's ability to change residences. The right to relocate
was not considered to be absolute, but instead based on the
circumstances of each case. For instance, in Clarke v.
Clarke,32 the court asserted that "the welfare of the child and
not the shortcomings of the respective parties ... [was] deter-
minative."3 3 Similarly, in Shea v. Shea,3 4 the court stated
27. Id. at 1015. See also Clarke v. Clarke, 217 P.2d 401, 402 (Cal. 1950);
Stack v. Stack, 11 Cal. Rptr. 177, 183 (Ct. App. 1961).
28. See Stack, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
29. The court's general ease in allowing the mother to change her residence
and granting the accompanying modification in the custody order is demon-
strated in Stack where the court held that, as a general rule, California courts
retain the power to permit a custodial parent to remove the child from the state
of jurisdiction to either a sister state, or to a foreign country. Id.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 61-65.
31. See generally Clarke, 217 P.2d 401, 402; Stack, 11 Cal. Rptr. 177, 183.
32. 217 P.2d 401 (Cal. 1950).
33. Id. at 402.
34. 223 P.2d 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
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that "a court, in the absence of a finding that the child's re-
moval would prejudice its rights or welfare,35 has no power to
prohibit the parent having custody from taking the child out
of a particular county."36 Thus, a court would not permit re-
location if it anticipated that the move would prejudice the
child or that relocation was not in the child's best interests.
As with current family law principles, the child's interests
and welfare superseded the interests and needs of the parent.
The court also required the desired move to be in good
faith; it could not be for the purpose of frustrating the non-
custodial parent's visitation rights. 7 The court in Evans v.
Evans38 held that removing a child from the state of resi-
dence and establishing a new home elsewhere was not consid-
ered "wrongful conduct"39 if "frustration of the other parent's
visitation rights was not the specific intent of the removal."4 °
Therefore, as long as the move-away parent did not desire the
residential relocation for the purpose of intentionally keeping
the noncustodial parent at a distance, it appears that the
courts tended to be lenient in granting requested custody
modifications when the custodial parent wished to move. If
the ultimate outcome of the move functioned to frustrate or
interfere with the noncustodial parent's visitation rights, this
in itself was not sufficient to prevent the desired move, where
the interference was not intended.4 '
35. In Dozier v. Dozier, 334 P.2d 957 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959), the court refused
to permit the mother to move from California to Connecticut to be near her
family and to obtain employment. Id. at 957. The court denied the move claim-
ing it would endanger the 8-year-old boy's health (he was "susceptible to
bronchial pneumonia or infection and asthmatic attacks"), and because the evi-
dence failed to show any "real financial, employment, educational, health, or
housing consideration" behind the proposed move. Id. at 960-61. The trial
court, however, retained jurisdiction of custody, contending that "when the boy
is older, stronger, and better able to withstand the eastern climate, if circum-
stances arise justifying the move, the court may, on proper application, permit
his removal." Id. at 962.
36. Shea, 223 P.2d at 33.
37. In Gudel v. Gudelj, 259 P.2d 656 (Cal. 1953), the California Supreme
Court denied the custodial mother permission to remove her minor son from the
county because she threatened to remove the boy from the state and change his
name, thus defeating the father's visitation rights. Id. at 660.
38. 8 Cal. Rptr. 412 (Ct. App. 1960).
39. Id. at 416.
40. Id.
41. One California court stated that "Itihe mere fact that [the] plaintiff may
thus be deprived of reasonable visitation rights is not necessarily determina-
tive; again, the welfare of the child is the controlling consideration." Foley v.
1994] 325
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Thus, prior to the statutory changes in California Family
Code section 302042 which were implemented to set aside the
tender years doctrine, the move-away parent could not relo-
cate if doing so would be detrimental to the child, or if the
purpose of the move was to interfere with the noncustodial
parent's continuing contact with the child. Moreover, if the
proposed move was "unrelated to the child's welfare" and,
therefore, not in good faith, the court typically would refuse
to modify the custody order to permit the move.43
3. Change of Circumstances Requirement
Before the original custody order would be modified to
permit the proposed relocation, the court typically required
that the move-away parent show a "change of circum-
stances."44 According to the court in Gantner v. Gantner,45
"[t]he rule is ... that to justify a modification there must be a
change of circumstances arising after the original decree is
entered .... ,46 The change of circumstances standard is still
in effect. The purpose of this "judge made" rule was, and still
is, to "protect the court, the parties and the child from inter-
minable and vexatious litigation."
41
Consistent with modern family law principles, 4 the bur-
den of proving a change of circumstances was upon the par-
ent who desired the custody modification. 49 The moving
party had to show that the welfare of the child required a
Foley, 29 Cal. Rptr. 857, 861 (Ct. App. 1963). Furthermore, in Milne v. Gold-
stein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 243 (Ct. App. 1961), the court reasoned that:
[tihe fact that the resident parent may be deprived of visitation rights
is generally not alone sufficient to justify restraint on the other par-
ent's free movement.... But if the specific motive is the frustration of
the other parent's visitation rights and is unrelated to the child's wel-
fare, permission to remove will be denied.
Id. at 245.
42. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3020 (West 1994).
43. Milne, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
44. Gantner v. Gantner, 246 P.2d 923, 927 (Cal. 1952).
45. Id.
46. Id. See also Forslund v. Forslund, 37 Cal. Rptr. 489, 499 (Ct. App.
1964).
47. Stack v. Stack, 11 Cal. Rptr. 177, 186 (Ct. App. 1961).
48. See discussion infra part H.B.l.b.
49. Forslund, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
[Vol. 35326
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change of custody, or that the circumstances and conditions
changed so as to justify such change.50
B. Current Treatment of Move-Away Cases
1. Overview of Current Public Policy and Legislation
in the Family Law Context
Many of-the policy considerations evident throughout the
historical development of the treatment of move-away cus-
tody cases persist today. First and foremost, the court's pri-
mary goal is to support a course of action that will promote
the "best interests" of the child or children involved in a dis-
pute.51 Although the court may consider the interests and
needs of the parents involved, the court's ultimate custody
determination must be based on the best interests of the
child.52 California Family Code section 3040 sets forth: "Cus-
tody should be awarded ... according to the best interests of
the child ....- 3 Section 3011 further explains this principle:
"In making a determination of the best interest of the child
... the court shall, among any other factors it finds relevant,
consider all of the following: (a) The health, safety, and wel-
fare of the child."5
4
This primary focus on the child often results in the exclu-
sion of parental interests and needs from consideration.5 5
The desires and needs of the parents are secondary to those of
50. Id. In Evans v. Evans, 8 Cal. Rptr. 412 (Ct. App. 1960), the court re-
quired only that the move-away parents have an "ample reason" for the removal
of the children. Id. at 416. In contrast, the court in Dozier v. Dozier, 334 P.2d
957 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959), was stricter in its required showing and maintained
that the move-away parent must have a "compelling reason" for the proposed
residential relocation. Id. at 961. In Dozier, the judge would not permit the
proposed relocation because the mother's desire to be near her relatives was not
a sufficiently compelling reason to permit the modification. Id. at 958. In con-
trast, in Evans the court was more lenient. The judge was satisfied that the
mother presented an "ample reason" for the desired move, namely, that she was
making a "bona fide" attempt to raise her children in a normal family environ-
ment. Evans, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
51. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3040 (West 1994).
52. "The paramount consideration in determining the custody of a minor
child is the welfare and best interest of the child." Bartold v. Bartold, 318 P.2d
69, 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). See also 67A
C.J.S. Parent & Child § 20 (1978 & Supp. 1993).
53. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3040(a) (West 1994) (emphasis added).
54. Id. § 3011(a). Note the wide latitude of discretion given in this section
exemplified in the language "among any other factors it finds relevant."
55. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
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the child, and because the best interests of the child remains
the controlling influence in any custody determination, "the
feelings and desires of the parents are not to be considered,
except insofar as they affect the best interests of the child."
5 1
Furthermore, family court custody orders also aim to fos-
ter and preserve "frequent and continuing contact" between
the child and both parents and to make child rearing a joint
endeavor.57 California Family Code section 3020 sets forth:
The Legislature finds and declares that it is the pub-
lic policy of this state to assure minor children of frequent
and continuing contact with both parents after the par-
ents have separated or dissolved their marriage, and to
encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities
of child rearing in order to effect this policy, except where
that contact would not be in the best interests of the child
58
In summary, these code sections identify the overriding con-
cerns inherent in family law: to make a custody determina-
tion that is in the best interests of the child, while promoting
frequent and continuing contact with both parents and active
involvement by both parents in child raising.
a. Change in Policy: "Tender Years" Doctrine
Overruled
Pursuant to California Family Code section 3040(1), in
making an order for custody to either parent, the court "shall
not prefer a parent as custodian because of that parent's
sex."59 In essence, this gender-neutral provision completely
56. 33 CAL. JuR. 3D Family Law § 914 (1994). However, an agreement or
custody stipulation between the parents should be considered by the courts if it
appears "reasonable." Id.
57. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3020 (West 1994).
58. Id. To further facilitate the public policy goal of"frequent and continu-
ing contact" with both parents, there is a statutory presumption affecting the
burden of proof that joint custody is in the best interests of the child. Id. § 3080.
However, this presumption only applies when both parents agree to joint cus-
tody. Id. When there is no agreement among the parents to follow a joint cus-
tody arrangement, California law establishes no preference or presumption in
disputes regarding joint or sole custody. Id. §§ 3040(a)(1), (b).
59. Id. § 3040(a)(1). Notwithstanding California Family Code section
3040(a)(1), which prohibits the preference of a parent based on that parent's
sex, the mother is still frequently found to be the most appropriate parent. See
generally cases cited supra note 8. It is possible that sole custody is still over-
whelmingly awarded to the mother of the child because public policy notions
behind the tender years doctrine still prevail in current family law custody de-
[Vol. 35328
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overrules the former "tender years" doctrine. 60 This change
in policy is critical, because the court currently has to weigh
and balance the facts and circumstances of each case instead
of simply making the determination based upon the child's
age.
Hence, current public policy abandons the former statu-
tory presumption that the mother is automatically the better
parent if the child is of tender years. In addition, it advances
the notion that child rearing is a joint endeavor, requiring
input and assumption of responsibility by both parents. In
furtherance of this policy, California Family Code section
3080 mandates, "[tihere is a presumption, affecting the bur-
den of proof, that joint custody is in the best interest of a mi-
nor child .... 1 Similarly, California Family Code section
3040(1) states that the court will try to award custody "[t]o
both parents jointly."2
The term "joint custody" does not necessarily mean that
custody time is split equally between the parents. A common
misconception is that "joint" custody constitutes equal shar-ing.6 Joint custody merely means that one parent does not
have sole custody of the child-in reality, joint custody en-
compasses a variety of arrangements. It is not uncommon for
the parties to stipulate to, or for the trial court to grant to the
parents, joint custody where one parent has primary custody
for the majority of the child's time and the other parent re-
ceives minimal visitation rights.6 4 The essential hallmark of
terminations, despite the abolition of this doctrine and the implementation of
California Family Code section 3040(a)(1).
60. See discussion supra part II.A.1.
61. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 1994) (emphasis added).
62. Id. § 3040(a)(1) (emphasis added).
63. The court in In re Marriage of Birnbaum, 260 Cal. Rptr. 210 (Ct. App.
1989), acknowledged:
It is doubtful that any two words mean as many different things to
as many different people as the words "joint custody."
There seems to be a popular misconception that joint physical cus-
tody means the children spend exactly one-half their time with each
parent ....
Equal division of a child's time between the parents is not the hall-
mark of joint custody.
Id. at 214-15.
64. See generally cases cited supra note 8.
3291994]
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"joint custody" is that both parents share parenting responsi-
bilities, often in separate homes.65
Despite the statutory preference for joint custody, the
court will award any custody arrangement that will benefit
the child. If one parent is awarded sole custody of the child,
the general rule and goal of the court is to award reasonable
visitation rights to the noncustodial parent.66 If the parties
cannot agree to a stipulated settlement that can be finalized
in a custody order,67 a determination of the best custody ar-
rangement is a discretionary matter left up to the judge.68
California Family Code section 3040(b) grants the trial
court judge a wide latitude of power and discretion in resolv-
ing custody disputes and in granting custody awards.69 Cali-
fornia Family Code section 3040(b) "establishes neither a
preference nor a presumption for or against joint legal cus-
tody, joint physical custody, or sole custody, but allows the
court and the family the widest discretion to choose a parent-
ing plan which is in the best interests of the child or chil-
dren."70 Such an exercise of discretion is not to be disturbed
on appeal in the absence of a showing of abuse. 71 However,
the judge must exercise his or her discretion in light of the
important policy considerations previously discussed.72
b. Required Showing for Modification of Existing
Custody Order
Once a custody award has been finalized in a court order,
the order will typically be upheld in the interest of stability
and consistency. 73 The court in In re Marriage of McGinnis"4
65. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3020 (West 1994).
66. California Family Code section 3100 sets forth, "the court shall grant
reasonable visitation rights to a parent unless it is shown that the visitation
would be detrimental to the best interests of the child." Id. § 3100.
67. California Family Code section 3061 provides: "[Tihe court shall, except
in exceptional circumstances, enter an order granting temporary custody in ac-
cordance with the agreement or understanding, or in accordance with any stip-
ulation of the parties." Id. § 3061.
68. Id. § 3040(b).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
70. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3040(b) (West 1994) (emphasis added).
71. In re Marriage of Urband, 137 Cal. Rptr. 433, 434 (Ct. App. 1977); Foley
v. Foley, 29 Cal. Rptr. 857, 861 (Ct. App. 1963).
72. See also 10 WrrKuN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, PARENT AND CHILD
§ 139 (1989 & Supp. 1993). See discussion supra part II.B.1.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 90-94.
74. 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182 (Ct. App. 1992).
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stated this policy: "A change of custody is the exception, not
the rule."75 This policy attempts to ensure that custody modi-
fication is based upon legitimate needs so that such attempts
will not create unnecessary complications.
Consistent with earlier cases, to modify the original cus-
tody order, the moving party must show a "substantial
change of circumstances."7 6 The California Supreme Court in
In re Marriage of Carney7 7 held that:
It is settled that to justify ordering a change in cus-
tody there must generally be a persuasive showing of
changed circumstances affecting the child. And that
change must be substantial: a child will not be removed
from the prior custody of one parent and given to the
other "unless the material facts and circumstances occur-
ring subsequently are of a kind to render it essential or
expedient for the welfare of the child that there be a
change."
78
The burden of proving a substantial change of circum-
stances rests on the party desiring the modification. 79 To
meet this required showing, a clear statement of reasons to
justify the modification must be articulated.8 " The parent
that wishes to relocate must file an order to show cause for
modification of the original custody decree to have the move
incorporated into the custody agreement, or the nonmoving
party must file an order to show cause that the proposed
move constitutes a substantial change in circumstances.8 1 In
the latter situation, the nonmoving party typically requests
sole custody if the moving party carries out the proposed
move.
8 2
What is considered to be "substantial" is context-based
and entirely dependent upon the facts and circumstances of
75. Id. at 186.
76. See also Speelman v. Super. Ct., 199 Cal. Rptr. 784, 786 (Ct. App. 1983);
In re Marriage of Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 80 (Ct. App. 1980). See also 10
WITKIN, supra note 72, § 140. See discussion supra part II.A.3.
77. 598 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1979).
78. Id. at 38 (citations omitted).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
80. See Speelman, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
81. See generally CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, PRACTICE UNDER THE
CALIFORNIA FAMILY CODE, §§ 7.57-.58 (M. Dee Samuels et al. eds., 1994);
Surace, supra note 7, at 498-99.
82. See In re Marriage of Fingert, 271 Cal. Rptr. 389, 390-91 (Ct. App.
1990); In re Marriage of Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 254 (Ct. App. 1986). See
generally Surace, supra note 7, at 498-99.
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each case. Generally, this threshold showing is easily ful-
filled because the proposed move itself usually constitutes a
substantial change in circumstances.8 3 If the proposed move
is likely to interfere with the visitation rights of the noncus-
todial parent, this will typically be deemed a substantial
change of circumstances8 4 because such an interference is
contrary to the public policy in favor of assuring minor chil-
dren "frequent and continuing contact with both parents" fol-
lowing marital dissolution. 5 The court in In re Marriage of
Murga86 stated that "the decision of a noncustodial parent to
establish residence in a place that is far enough away to pre-
clude the exercise of existing visitation rights necessarily con-
stitutes a changed circumstance sufficient to support" the
modification of the visitation order."7 However, the judge
must keep in mind that the best interests of the child, not
parental interests and needs, 8 remain the primary
consideration. 9
83. In at least one case, however, the court held that there was not a suffi-
cient showing of a substantial change in circumstances by virtue of the pro-
posed move itself. In Speelman v. Super. Ct., 199 Cal. Rptr. 784 (Ct. App.
1983), the trial court denied a custody modification at the request of the mother
because she failed even to attempt to show a change in circumstances that
would warrant a modification in the custody order. Id. at 789. By holding that
the moving party failed to meet her burden of proving that there had been a
substantial change of circumstances since the original custody order, the court
abstained from analyzing the proposed move. Id. Thus, it appears that the
court in this particular case was stricter than can usually be expected and may
be distinguished from other current move-away cases in that the court did not
follow the trend of finding the change of circumstances requirement to have
been met by the move itself. Generally, therefore, the court will find the thresh-
old showing has been met, and will then focus on the move itself and whether it
should be permitted within a modified custody order.
84. "Interference by a child's custodian with the visitation rights of the non-
custodial parent constitutes a change of circumstances which may justify a
change in custody." 10 WITKIN, supra note 72, § 146.
85. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3020 (West 1994). See supra text accompanying
notes 57-58.
86. 163 Cal. Rptr. 79 (Ct. App. 1980).
87. Id. at 80.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
89. The following explanation demonstrates how the child's welfare re-
mains the paramount and controlling consideration, even if the substantial
change of circumstances standard has been met:
There is no fixed standard by which one may determine what consti-
tutes such a substantial change of circumstances. The court is guided
only by the rule of very general application that the welfare and best
interests of the child are the primary concern in determining whether
the order shall be changed; and even though there has been a substan-
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The public policy behind the change in circumstances re-
quirement for custody modification is to promote the "dual
goals of judicial economy and protecting stable custody ar-
rangements."90 The change of circumstances rule is designed
to prevent repetitive and unnecessary litigation arising from
minor changes in the custodial parent's life. In the interest of
stability, the court wishes to discourage litigation in custody
disputes by preserving established modes of custody.91
Consequently, the change of circumstances requirement func-
tions to keep trivial or less significant issues out of the court
system by establishing a standard that must be met before
the court will reexamine a particular custodial
arrangement.
92
In addition, California public policy is designed to pre-
serve and protect stable custody arrangements. The court in
In re Marriage of Burchard93 maintained that "[t]he child's
need for and right to stability and continuity have been
widely recognized."94 Common sense dictates that it would
be detrimental and emotionally disruptive to uproot a child
from living arrangements she or he is accustomed to unless
the change is absolutely vital.
Once this threshold requirement had been met, the trial
court's focus turns to the move itself: the alleged reasons be-
hind the desired relocation, its speculated consequences, the
tial change of circumstances the court should not modify the order un-
less the welfare of the child will be promoted thereby. In other words,
the substantiality of the change of circumstances is tested with respect
to the child's welfare rather than the parents' welfare.
24 Am. JUR. 2D Divorce & Separation § 1011 (1983 & Supp. 1993) (emphasis
added).
90. Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 488 (Cal. 1986). The court in
Burchard maintained:
The changed-circumstance rule is not a different test ... but an ad-
junct to the best-interest test. It provides, in essence, that once it has
been established that a particular custodial arrangement is in the best
interests of the child, the court need not reexamine that question. In-
stead, it should preserve the established mode of custody unless some
significant change in circumstances indicates that a different arrange-
ment would be in the child's best interest.
Id.
91. Id. at 488.
92. Id.
93. 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986).
94. Id. at 491 n.6.
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best interests of the child, how the proposed move will affect
the child's welfare, and other relevant issues and concerns.9 5
c. General Rule for Move-Away Disputes
As a general rule, current statutory law suggests that
residential changes should be permitted, as long as they are
in the child's best interests and the child's welfare or rights
are not jeopardized.s6 California Family Code section 7501
provides: "A parent entitled to the custody of a child has a
right to change the residence of the child, subject to the power
of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the
rights or welfare of the child."97 The language stating "sub-
ject to the power of the court," grants the trial court judge
wide discretion in the decision as to whether the custodial
parent should be allowed to relocate to another county or out
of state.98
However, current case law reveals that the rule gov-
erning move-away custody cases is not as general, nor as leni-
ent, as suggested in California Family Code section 7501." 9
More specifically, as exemplified in recent cases, the reasons
for and circumstances surrounding the move are subject to
stricter scrutiny. A wide variety of factors must be taken into
95. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
96. See 33 CAL. JuR. 3D Family Law § 938 (1994); 4 GODDARD, CAL. PRAC.
Family Law Practice § 196 (1981 & Supp. 1992).
97. CAL. FAm. CODE § 7501 (West 1994). Incidentally, this code section is
scarcely cited, if cited at all, in move-away custody cases. This lack of usage
indicates the move-away dilemma is not as easily resolved as section 7501
might suggest. But see infra note 275. Senate Bill 1350 "restates and modern-
izes the language in Section 7501 of the California Family Code that has been
the law since 1872." Legal Fact Sheet for Senate Bill 1350 from the Senate
Committee on Health and Human Services (1994) (on file with author).
98. The following description of the trial court's discretion reflects the wide
latitude such discretionary power entails:
The trial court in child custody matters is given a wide discretion as to
removal of children from the jurisdiction. A court may permit a parent
who has custody of a child to remove the child from the state, either to
a sister state or to a foreign country. On the other hand, the court has
the power to prohibit removal of the child from the jurisdiction, and
even to impose restrictions on its removal from a specified county
within the state.
33 CAL. JuR. 3D Family Law § 938 (citations omitted) (1994).
99. See supra note 97.
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consideration, and the move must be essential, beneficial,
and imperative. 10 0
In contrast, the standard in California Family Code sec-
tion 7501 seems more lenient in that it focuses on the possible
negative implications of the proposed move. Rather than con-
centrating on the anticipated benefits of the move and requir-
ing that the move promote the child's best interests as is cur-
rently required, the drafters of California Family Code
section 7501 apparently intended to restrict relocation only if
it would harm the child. Thus, while California Family Code
section 7501 requires the move not be permitted if it harms
the child, current case law suggests the move not be permit-
ted if it does not benefit the child. The latter is a more diffi-
cult showing to make.
Focusing on current case law in order to identify the
ways in which this standard is challenging to meet, it ap-
pears that the desired relocation must be in the child's best
interests and promote the child's welfare.10 1 This indicates
that a mere change in circumstances is not sufficient to meet
the required showing. In addition to fulfilling the require-
ment of showing a substantial change in circumstances, the
moving party must also show that the proposed modification
would benefit the child.1 0 2 This standard of proof is very
strict and fact-dependent. Therefore, because the factors of
each case are critical in arriving at an end result, the outcome
of a move-away custody dispute is often unpredictable.
2. Case-by-Case Analysis of the Competing Needs &
Interests of the Parties
Because no legislation currently exists to identify the
particular factors a judge should consider, or to guide a judge
in making such determinations in light of available facts,
each case that comes before the court must be decided on a
case-by-case basis. In ascertaining whether a proposed relo-
100. In re Marriage of McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 186 (Ct. App. 1992); see
also Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 489 (Cal. 1986); In re Marriage of Car-
ney, 598 P.2d 36, 38 (Cal. 1979); Speelman v. Super. Ct., 199 Cal. Rptr. 784, 786
(Ct. App. 1983).
101. See Burchard, 724 P.2d at 489. The court in Burchard agreed with ap-
pellant's assertion that the parent filing for the modification "should have the
burden of persuading the court that a change in custody is essential or expedient
for the welfare of the child." Id. (emphasis added).
102. McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186; Speelman, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
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cation should be allowed, the trial court weighs and balances
a wide variety of facts and issues in each situation, thereby
arriving at an individualized result.
Due to the lack of legislative to guidelines, judges must
look to the particular circumstances, parties, and reasons of-
fered for a proposed move. When evaluating the custodial
parent's reasons for relocation, the court must anticipate how
the move will affect the child's welfare,10 3 the manner in
which the move will affect the noncustodial parent, and the
consequences if the existing custody order is not modified to
permit the desired move. In essence, the court must specu-
late as to the consequences of a denial of the requested cus-
tody modification, as well as the consequences that might re-
sult if the modification is granted allowing relocation.
This case-by-case analysis entails a detailed examination
of three competing considerations: the child, the custodial
move-away parent, and the remaining noncustodial par-
ent.10 4 Focusing first on the custodial parent desiring reloca-
tion, this parent typically has a variety of general interests
and specific reasons for the proposed move.10 5 In general, the
custodial parent has an interest in personal autonomy, which
is intrinsically linked to the capacity to relocate and travel
freely. Moreover, parental autonomy, or the ability to control
the upbringing of the child-which is commonly associated
with being a primary caretaker of a child-is typically
equated with the freedom to decide where the child is raised.
Specific reasons the custodial parent may use to justify
the desired relocation include a desire to move to seek out or
accept an employment opportunity,1 0 6 to enable a new spouse
to accept a job offer,10 7 to improve or continue her educa-
tion,108 to be close to family and relatives,10 9 or to find less
103. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 1994).
104. See supra note 13.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 103-09. See also supra text accompa-
nying notes 2-7.
106. In re Marriage of Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 254 (Ct. App. 1986).
107. In re Marriage of Roe, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 353 (Ct. App. 1993), review
granted and cause transferred sub nom. by In re Marriage of Clinton H.R., 856
P.2d 1131 (Cal. 1993), aff'd sub nom., In re Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d
295 (Ct. App. 1993); In re Marriage of McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 184 (Ct.
App. 1992).
108. In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 840, 842 (Ct. App. 1991).
109. Id.; Dozier v. Dozier, 334 P.2d 957, 959 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
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expensive or more suitable housing. 110 The custodial parent
may also desire to relocate with the hope of starting anew
after the divorce111 or to avoid the ex-spouse. 11 2 In addition,
the custodial parent may seek to relocate in order to provide
her child with a better education, more recreational or extra-
curricular opportunities, an expanded peer group that in-
cludes members of the family,1 13 or for health-related
reasons. 
114
In competition with the interests and needs of the custo-
dial parent, the noncustodial parent will likely attempt to
prevent the relocation in order to protect his visitation rights.
Visitation rights are often infringed upon when the custodial
parent relocates, because the increase in distance typically
augments travel costs, detracts from time available to spend
with the child, and makes visitation more inconvenient over-
all.1 1 5 The remaining parent may also oppose the move be-
cause it represents a loss of control over the child's upbring-
ing and may jeopardize existing emotional ties with the child.
Finally, yet of utmost importance, the child's feelings
and interests regarding the move must be taken into consid-
eration. In essence, for an existing custody order to be modi-
fied to permit relocation, the move must be in the best inter-
ests of the child, regardless of the strength of the custodial
110. Dozier, 334 P.2d at 962.
111. The custodial parent:
[M]ay view the move as therapeutic, helping her to recover from the
trauma of the divorce and preparing her for life apart from her ex-
spouse. She may also be attempting to establish her authority as head
of the new family unit created after the divorce to demonstrate her
independence from her ex-spouse.
Bulow & Gellnan, supra note 13, at 951 (footnote omitted).
112. In re Marriage of Ciganovich, 132 Cal. Rptr. 261, 262 (Ct. App. 1976).
113. Dozier, 334 P.2d at 959.
114. Evans v. Evans, 8 Cal. Rptr. 412, 416 (Ct. App. 1960).
115. The noncustodial parent is typically opposed to the proposed move be-
cause of its probable resulting impairment of visitation rights. The noncus-
todial parent:
[M]ay be interested in being able to see the child frequently for several
reasons: he may simply enjoy spending time with the child; he may
believe that his presence and companionship will make a positive con-
tribution to the child's development; or he may have hopes of develop-
ing a good relationship with the child in the future as the child ma-
tures and the trauma of divorce fades.
Bulow & Gellman, supra note 13, at 952.
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parent's interests in the proposed move.116 Thus, the "child's
best interests," a principle encompassing the child's safety,
health and welfare, remains the court's primary
consideration. 117
Consequently, the court will determine whether visita-
tion will be feasible in terms of time, distance, and travel ex-
penses after relocation takes place. The court also considers
factors such as the child's age and residential preference,"'
as well as the degree of the child's attachment to the school
system,1 9 extracurricular activities and his or her peer
group.120 In doing so, the court will speculate as to how the
move will affect the quality of the child's education and over-
all welfare. In addition, the court will consider how the antic-
ipated advantages of relocation, such as better employment
opportunities and therefore a higher income for the custodial
parent and more suitable housing, will in turn enhance the
material well-being and standard of living of the child.' 2 1
3. Factors Outside the Scope of Judicial Consideration
Although the trial court judge has wide discretion 122 in
considering numerous factors when making custody determi-
nations and granting modifications, a few factors are not
within the judge's discretion to consider as determinative ele-
ments. Thus, in the analysis of which parent is the "better"
parent for custody purposes, or in evaluating the alleged
benefits and circumstances surrounding a proposed reloca-
tion, judicial discretion is restricted by important policy
considerations.
116. Often, with its primary focus on the child, the best interests of the child
standard results in the exclusion of the parents' interests as a significant con-
cern. Id. at 965-66. See supra note 89.
117. "In making a determination of the best interest of the child in any pro-
ceeding... the court shall, among any other factors it finds relevant, consider
... [tihe health, safety, and welfare of the child." CAL. FAm. CODE § 3011(a)
(West 1994). See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
118. In re Marriage of Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 251-52 (Ct. App. 1986).
However, in order for the judge to consider the child's preferences, the child
must be mature enough to articulate a legitimate and honest desire. Id. at 256.
119. In re Marriage of McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 186 (Ct. App. 1992).
120. Id.
121. See discussion infra part II.C.5.




One explicit limitation, previously discussed, 123 prevents
a parent's gender from serving as a basis for a custody deter-
mination; a judge's decision must be gender-neutral. 124 An-
other limitation requires that the court refrain from using a
custody award or the denial of a requested modification as a
basis or means by which to punish a parent for his or her
misconduct, or to reward the unoffending parent. 125 More-
over, comparative income, or economic advantage or dispar-
ity, is not a permissible basis for a custody award.126 Nor can
the court make decisions based upon religion, 127 race,1 28 sex-
ual orientation, 129 or handicapped status.
31
Finally, a trial judge should not base his or her custody
determination on mere "disapproval of the morals and other
characteristics of a parent that do not harm the child."'
3
'
C. Factors Considered Influential by the Court in
Resolving Move-Away Custody Cases
In resolving move-away custody disputes, the trial court
examines and evaluates a variety of factors. Once the requi-
site showing of a substantial change of circumstances 3 2 has
been met, the court will shift its focus to a context-based
analysis of all permissible and relevant factors surrounding
123. See discussion supra part II.B.l.a.
124. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(a)(1) (West 1994). Section 3040(a)(1) provides:
"In making an order for custody to either parent, the court... shall not prefer a
parent as custodian because of that parent's sex." Id.
125. In re Marriage of Stoker, 135 Cal. Rptr. 616, 618 (Ct. App. 1977).
126. Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 488 (Cal. 1986) (finding the trial
court's reliance upon the relative economic positions of the parties was imper-
missible). This limitation, however, is frequently overlooked and economic is-
sues currently play a significant role in custody determinations. See infra note
196. See also discussion infra part II.C.5.
127. In re Marriage of Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 81-82 (Ct. App. 1980); In re
Marriage of Urband, 137 Cal. Rptr. 433, 433 (Ct. App. 1977).
128. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
129. Nadler v. Super. Ct., 63 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354 (Ct. App. 1967).
130. In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 42 (Cal. 1979). A court cannot
make a determination that one parent is not the "better" parent because that
parent is handicapped or is physically unable to participate in physical activi-
ties and outings with his or her child. In Carney, the court held that the fa-
ther's confinement to a wheelchair did not mean that he was not the better
parent. Id. at 42-43. The court asserted that the "essence of parenting" was not
defined by the physical activities a parent could engage in with his or her child,
but rather the "ethical, emotional and intellectual guidance the parent gives to
the child throughout his formative years, and often beyond." Id. at 43.
131. 33 CAL. Jun. 3D Family Law § 914 (1994).
132. See discussion supra part II.B.l.b.
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the dispute, and the arguments in favor of and against the
proposed relocation. 138
Although the factors the court will consider are highly
particularized since they are drawn from each dispute as it
comes before the court, a series of influential and typical con-
siderations can be garnered from recent case law. This com-
ment focuses on significant considerations as identified by re-
cent California cases. 134 While the following description of
the court's primary considerations is not exhaustive, this
comment highlights current critical considerations California
family law courts typically examine.
1. Policy Considerations
The resolution of move-away custody disputes necessi-
tates a multi-factor analysis, guided by the need to determine
the most suitable outcome that, first and foremost, promotes
the best interests of the child involved, and secondly, gives
deference to issues of parental and personal autonomy. 135 In
determining an outcome that is sensitive to these competing
interests, 13 6 the trial court's decision is necessarily controlled
by important public policy principles. Specifically, public pol-
icy dictates that the court's primary consideration is the
child's best interests, a principle encompassing the child's
safety, health and welfare. 13 7 Hence, if a proposed relocation
is not in the child's best interests, the court is vested with the
133. California Family Code section 3040(b) grants the trial court judge "the
widest discretion" in determining the most suitable parenting plan in a given
situation. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3040(b) (West 1994). This wide latitude of discre-
tion necessarily indicates that the judge is permitted to consider all permissible
and relevant factors in each case. Furthermore, in making custody determina-
tions, the court is instructed to consider certain policy principles, "among any
other factors it finds relevant." Id. § 3011 (emphasis added).
134. To review this issue from the standpoint of each of the other forty-nine
states is beyond the scope of this comment. For general insight into the ap-
proaches employed by other states in move-away custody disputes, see gener-
ally Debra E. Wax, Annotation, Interference by Custodian of Child with Noncus-
todial Parent's Visitation Rights as Ground for Change of Custody, 28 A.L.R.
4th 9 (1984 & Supp. 1993); see also Mandy S. Cohen, Note, A Toss of the Dice
... The Gamble with Post-Divorce Relocation Laws, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127
(1989); Surace, supra note 7.
135. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
136. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
137. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3011(a) (West 1994).
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discretion and power to restrict the move by refusing to mod-
ify the existing custody decree. 138
2. Parental Roles and Relationships
If the court considers both parents to be suitable par-
ents,139 the court will commence its context-based analysis of
the circumstances and facts surrounding a move-away cus-
tody dispute in order to arrive at a proper solution. As evi-
dent in recent California cases, one critical and paramount
factor frequently considered is the "nature and amount of
contact"140 and emotional bonds between each parent and the
child following marital dissolution. 14 1 In regards to the "na-
ture" of the contact between the parent and child, the court
will look to the "ethical, emotional, and intellectual guidance
the parent gives to the child throughout his formative
years."' 42 The court will evaluate the role of the parent, 43
both in terms of quality and quantity of contact, and the rela-
tionship between the parent and child, with a focus on the
emotional bonds therein.
In Burchard v. Garay,14 4 the court maintained that "ex-
isting emotional bonds between parent and child are the first
consideration in any best-interests determination."145 There,
the trial court's modification of the custody arrangement
138. In In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1991), the
court denied the move stating, "[tihere was no evidence that the best interests
of the children would be promoted by the move to Pennsylvania" from Califor-
nia. Id. at 845.
139. See infra text accompanying notes 159-61.
140. Pursuant to California Family Code section 3011(c), the nature and
amount of contact between the parent and child is a consideration the court
must address in making a determination of the best interests of the child.
141. Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 492 (Cal. 1986); In re Marriage of
Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 44 (Cal. 1979); In re Marriage of Roe, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352,
354-56 (Ct. App. 1993), review granted and cause transferred sub nom. by In re
Marriage of Clinton H.R., 856 P.2d 1131 (Cal. 1993), aff'd sub nom., In re Mar-
riage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993); Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. at
844-45.
142. Carney, 598 P.2d at 43.
143. The court in In re Marriage of Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Ct. App.
1986), looked to the father's assumption of "parenting responsibilities" in terms
of his role and participation in the children's "academic, athletic, social, and
religious activities." Id. at 254.
144. 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986). Although this case did not present a move-
away dilemma, it remains significant in that it demonstrates the importance of
emotional bonds in a custody determination.
145. Id. at 494.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
which awarded custody to the child's natural father was re-
versed as an abuse of discretion since the mother had been
the "primary caretaker" for their son from his birth until the
trial.146 Moreover, there was no serious deficiency in the
mother's care, and the child had become a "happy, healthy,
and well-adjusted boy" as a result of her supervision and con-
tact.147 The court's ultimate determination in this instance
was therefore based largely on the fact that not only was the
mother a capable parent, but her relationship with her son
was both secure and positive. 148 Hence, it appears that these
factors, coupled with California's strong policy in favor of fos-
tering "stability and continuity"149 in a child's upbringing,
prevailed in Burchard as the determinative considerations.
Another instance of the significance of parental roles and
relationships is exemplified by the case In re Marriage of
Roe. '5 In Roe, the court found the proposed relocation to be
in the best interests of the child and granted the mother's re-
quest to modify the custody order allowing her to move to Al-
abama with her child and her new husband.15 ' As in
Burchard, the court in Roe relied upon evidence that the
mother served as the son's "primary caretaker" and that he
had developed a "close and bonded relationship with her 'such
that it would be in his best interest to maintain that relation-
ship and it would be to his detriment not to do so.' "152 Fur-
thermore, the mother testified as to her involvement in her
son's education, and the fact that she had "sought the help of
a therapist in order to blend [her new husband's] family and
hers into a single family."' 53 In addition, the therapist with
whom the mother had consulted offered testimony that the
mother "was able to give clear direction" to the son, and that
she was "affectionate with him and they conversed easily."' 54
In contrast to this nurturing and positive relationship
between the mother and her son, the son's relationship with
146. Id. at 491-92.
147. Id. at 487.
148. Id.
149. Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 491 n.6 (Cal. 1986).
150. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352 (Ct. App. 1993), review granted and cause trans-
ferred sub noma. by In re Marriage of Clinton H.R., 856 P.2d 1131 (Cal. 1993),
aff'd sub nom., In re Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993).
151. Id. at 354.
152. Id. (citations omitted).




his father was characterized by emotional negativity. The
court found that because of the father's "continuing anger"
toward his ex-spouse, "he would be much less likely to sup-
port and encourage [the son's] frequent and continuing con-
tact" with his mother.155 Moreover, the father was character-
ized as "rigid and unbending," displaying "vindictiveness and
animosity."156 As such, the mother's parenting skills and
emotional capabilities were found to be "far superior" to those
of the father. 15
7
Consequently, the court modified the original custody
award in Roe to permit the mother to move to Alabama while
retaining primary custody of the minor son. 5 ' Therefore, it
appears that the court's principal consideration in determin-
ing whether the move was in the best interests of the child
was the constructive nature of the contact between the
mother and son, in contrast to the antagonistic attitude of the
father.
3. Examining the Child's Community Ties
The court in move-away custody cases will also examine
a child's ties to his or her community and speculate as to the
effects of relocation. A critical issue in this examination is
whether a proposed move will benefit the child or, instead,
create excessive instability and chaos.
In re Marriage of Rosson 159 reflects this type of analysis;
the Rosson court maintained that when a move-away custody
dispute must be decided in the courtroom, "the judge must
consider... the effect of the move upon the children when an
equally capable and involved parent remains in the commu-
nity and offers the children the opportunity to remain where
they have lived almost all of their lives." °6 0 This passage
demonstrates that the court's preliminary examination
should focus on whether each parent is "capable,"161 followed
155. In re Marriage of Roe, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 354 (Ct. App. 1993), review
granted and cause transferred sub nom. by In re Marriage of Clinton H.R., 856
P.2d 1131 (Cal. 1993), aff'd sub nom., In re Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d
295 (Ct. App. 1993).
156. Id. at 354.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 353.
159. 224 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Ct. App. 1986).
160. Id. at 259.
161. Id.
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by an evaluation of the nature and amount of contact be-
tween each parent and the child. The focus then turns upon
the child as a separate consideration from that of the parents.
In re Marriage of McGinnis162 reaffirmed the Rosson
court's analytical process by clarifying the notion that the
child's interests and needs are critical. 163 In McGinnis, the
court considered the ties the three minor children had estab-
lished in their community.1 6 4 The court referred to the chil-
dren's community "ties" in terms of "neighborhood friends,
school, sports activities, dentists, medical doctors, teachers,
etc."165 A critical factor in the court's decision to deny modifi-
cation of the custody order was the court's determination that
the children had significant ties to their current home
base. 166
Implicit in the examination of a child's ties to his or her
community is the assumption that such ties, if they exist,
should not be severed if doing so would be adverse to the best
interests of the child. As shown in Burchard v. Garay,
167 if
the current custody arrangement is workable, uprooting chil-
dren from the community to which they are accustomed is
typically not in their best interests. This notion is illustrated
by the Burchard court's statement: "We have frequently
stressed... the importance of stability and continuity in the
life of a child, and the harm that may result from disruption
of established patterns of care and emotional bonds."168
Thus, in the interest of stability and continuity, workable
custody arrangements are often protected and left intact. 169
162. 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182 (Ct. App. 1992).
163. Id. at 186-87.
164. In In re McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182 (Ct. App. 1992), the mother filed
a motion for change of custody, seeking sole physical custody to enable her to
relocate with her three minor children from Santa Barbara to Arcadia where
her new husband retained employment. Id. at 184. Ultimately, the trial court's
granting of the mother's request was reversed on appeal; the proposed reloca-
tion was not deemed imperative. Id.
165. Id. at 186.
166. Id. However, it remains necessary to acknowledge that other factors
such as the public policy interests in maintaining stable custody arrangements
and preserving contact between both parents contributed to this final outcome.
Id. at 185-86.
167. 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986).
168. Id. at 493.
169. See In re Marriage of McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 184 n.2 (Ct. App.
1992) (refusing to modify the custody order to allow the mother to relocate with
the children, in light of the "working shared parenting arrangement" and the
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4. Frequent and Continuing Contact & Visitation
Rights
Another critical factor the court will consider when de-
termining whether a desired move should be permitted is the
probable effects the desired move will have upon the noncus-
todial parent's visitation rights. Two primary issues are
present in this consideration. First, it is in the child's best
interests for the court to foster and preserve frequent and
continuing contact between the child and both parents follow-
ing marital dissolution. 170 Such contact creates the "emo-
tional bonds" the court in Burchard stressed as vital and nec-
essary to the child's development. 171 Visitation rights play
an especially important role between the child and the non-
custodial parent as the visitation arrangement may be the
only opportunity for the child and the parent to bond.1 72 The
distance created by the relocation may interfere with the non-
custodial parent's ability to exercise visitation rights because
of increased travel expenses and inconvenience, resulting in
detriment to the child.173 With these concerns in mind, the
trial court judge must determine whether the possible frus-
tration of visitation rights will, over time, counteract the best
interests of the child. Often, this consideration necessitates
the balancing of competing interests.174  The judge must
speculate as to the likely consequences of the move and bal-
father's "recent purchase of the family home to provide for continuity for the
children").
170. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (West 1994). See supra text accompanying
notes 51-54.
171. Burchard, 724 P.2d 486 at 494 ("[E]xisting emotional bonds between
parent and child are the first consideration in any best-interests determina-
tion."). See also In re Marriage of Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 80 (Ct. App. 1980)
("Continued contact with the noncustodial parent is vitally important to the
welfare of a child.").
172. See In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 840, 843 (Ct. App. 1991).
The court in Carlson stated:
[T]hat... lack of contact between the minor children and Petitioner/
Father for such a length of time is not a healthy environment for the
minor child to be raised in and would result in substantial harm to
them given the close relationship between the minor children and the
... Petitioner/Father.
Id.
173. McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 184 n.2 ("A custody decision allowing a
parent to remove the children out of the county is bound to interfere with the
remaining parent's ability to have frequent and continuing contact with his or
her children.").
174. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
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ance its probable benefits with the harm that will be caused
by not fostering frequent and continuing contact between the
child and the noncustodial parent.
The second issue concerns the role of the noncustodial
parent's visitation rights. 175 Pursuant to California Family
Code section 3 100,176 visitation rights are a right of the par-
ent. Section 3100 provides that "the court shall grant reason-
able visitation rights to a parent unless it is shown that the
visitation would be detrimental to the best interests of the
child."1 77 Consequently, permitting the custodial parent to
relocate may infringe upon the noncustodial parent's rights if
the move seriously interferes with the exercise of visitation
rights.
However, infringement of visitation rights-even if the
interference is serious-is generally not sufficient to warrant
the restriction of relocation. 178  It is necessary to note that
the court makes a sharp distinction between incidental inter-
ference of visitation rights, and the specific intent of the
move-away parent to affirmatively frustrate such rights.
71
Incidental interference, so long as it appears unintended, is
175. See 33 CAL. JuR. 3D Family Law § 939 (1994). In making a joint custody
order:
[T]he court must grant reasonable visitation rights to a parent unless
it is shown that the visitation would be detrimental to the best interest
of the child. The court has the discretion to grant reasonable visitation
rights to any other person having an interest in the welfare of the
child.
The parent's right to visitation is consonant with the public policy,
stated in the Family Code, of assuring children of frequent and contin-
uing contact with both parents.
Id. (citations omitted).
176. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3100 (West 1994).
177. Id.
178. "That the child's removal from the state practically deprives the father
of his visitation rights is 'generally' insufficient to justify restraint on the
mother's free movement." In re Marriage of Ciganovich, 132 Cal. Rptr. 261, 263
(Ct. App. 1976) (citation omitted).
179. The following guideline suggests how the effect of frustration of visita-
tion rights resulting from relocation may be treated:
[S]ince the stated policy of the custody laws is to assure minor chil-
dren of frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the
parents have separated or dissolved their marriage so as to preserve
the child's relationship with both parents, the court must take into ac-
count a noncustodial parent's ability to exercise visitation after the
move when evaluating the best interests of a child. Thus, if the specific
motive for removal of the child from the state is frustration of the other
parent's visitation rights and is unrelated to the child's welfare, per-
mission to remove the child will be denied.
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permissible and will not in itself warrant the denial of modifi-
cation of the existing custody order.180 Intended frustration
of visitation rights, however, has serious implications and
may persuade the court to restrict relocation. 181 This result
is likely because affirmative interference with the noncus-
todial parent's visitation rights is typically considered a bad
faith motive or tactic, and as such, is likely to influence the
court in determining that relocation would not serve the best
interests of the child.
The extent and impact of the frustration is the focus of
the court's consideration in determining the overall effects of
a contemplated move on the noncustodial parent's visitation
rights. 182 In re Marriage of Ciganovich13 sets forth the gen-
eral rule: "[A] parent having general custody is entitled to
change residence unless the move is detrimental to the child.
That the child's removal from the state practically deprives
the father of his visitation rights is 'generally' insufficient to
justify restraint on the mother's free movement."18 4 This
general rule, however, does not govern situations where the
moving parent "acts with an intent to frustrate or destroy the
[noncustodial parent's] visitation right."8 5
The application of this rule is apparent in Ciganovich,
where the California Court of Appeal held that the trial court
erred in failing to acknowledge the rule that removal of the
child with the specific intent of frustrating visitation rights
offends the best interests of the child, those of the noncus-
todial parent, and the policy of the court.1 8 6 In Ciganovich,
the mother was awarded custody of the minor children, while
the father was granted weekend visitation rights. 1 8 7 The evi-
dence revealed that the custodial mother engaged in a course
33 CAL. JuR. 3D Family Law § 938 (1994) (citations omitted). See also 4 GOD-
DARD, supra note 96, § 196.
180. Ciganovich, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
181. See Gudelj v. Gudelj, 259 P.2d 656, 660 (Cal. 1953); see generally Evans
v. Evans, 8 Cal. Rptr. 412, 416 (Ct. App. 1960).
182. In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 840, 842 (Ct. App. 1991) ("[A]
noncustodial parent's loss of the practical ability to exercise visitation is rele-
vant in deciding whether a custodial parent should be restrained from moving a
child to a different geographical area.").
183. 132 Cal. Rptr. 261 (Ct. App. 1976).
184. Id. at 263 (citation omitted).
185. Id. (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 264.
187. Id. at 262.
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of conduct aimed at avoiding her ex-spouse and preventing
him from exercising his visitation rights.18 Moreover, there
was no evidence that the mother had any legitimate reason
for the relocation. The court stated: "In this case there is not
the slightest doubt as to the mother's motivation. She went
to Reno, had no job or other preexisting reason for going there
.... Her entire course of conduct was one of concealment of
the children."18 9 Thus, incidental frustration of the noncus-
todial parent's visitation rights is generally overlooked, while
intended interference will likely result in a restriction of the
moving party's relocation.
Similarly, the court in In re Marriage of Finger 9° held:
"Appellate decisions in California that have approved restric-
tions upon a custodial parent's choice of domicile have arisen
only where the parent moving does so with an intent to frus-
trate or destroy the other parent's custody or visitation
rights." 9 1 Thus, it is evident that intentional frustration of
visitation rights can serve as a powerful factor in favor of re-
straining the move-away parent's relocation attempts. The
focus in such cases, therefore, is on the state of mind of the
moving parent, rather than the outcome of the move itself.
5. Relocation Prompted by Economic Factors
The court will also look to the move-away parent's pri-
mary justification for a desired move. 192 While the move-
away parent may allege that the move is in the best interests
of the child for educational, housing, or health-related rea-
sons, the parent frequently mentions economic factors as an
overriding justification. More specifically, the custodial par-
ent may wish to move in order to accept or seek a job after a
period of unemployment, to accept or seek out a better em-
ployment position,193 or to accommodate a new spouse in
188. In re Marriage of Cignavoich, 132 Cal. Rptr. 261, 264 (Ct. App. 1976).
189. Id. Following the mother's removal of the children from the state and
her use of a blind address to conceal their whereabouts, the trial court's deci-
sion to deny the father's request for modification of the custody order to protect
his rights was reversed and remanded. Id. at 261.
190. 271 Cal. Rptr. 389 (Ct. App. 1990).
191. Id. at 392.
192. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 253 (Ct. App.
1986) (looking at the moving parent's "legitimate job- related reasons" for her
proposed move).
193. See Fingert, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 390; Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
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similar circumstances. 194 In Roe, for example, the custodial
mother explained: "My husband has decided to accept this
employment rather than remain unemployed since the lack of
additional finances materially affects our standard of living
.... "19 Generally, the court will listen to these good faith
reasons, primarily because employment translates into in-
creased income, which in turn directly affects a child's wel-
fare. 196 Thus, if the move-away parent can connect the de-
sired relocation to an improvement in employment status
that is not merely speculative, the court may be more inclined
to permit the move because such an improvement will ulti-
mately benefit the child's standard of living and welfare.
197
In addition, the court in Rosson maintained that "a par-
ent must give serious consideration to moves which are best
for career advancement, since careers continue long past the
minority of children and are important for the financial and
psychological well-being of the parent."198 Such moves are
not only relevant to the child's welfare, but are intrinsically
194. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Roe, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 353 (Ct. App.
1993), review granted and cause transferred sub nom. by In re Marriage of Clin-
ton H.R., 856 P.2d 1131 (Cal. 1993), aff'd sub nom., In re Marriage of Roe, 23
Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993); In re Marriage of McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d
182, 184 (Ct. App. 1992).
195. Roe, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 353.
196. Id. It is important to note here that consideration of these economic
factors appears to be contradictory to the holding in Burchard v. Garay, 724
P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986), in which the California Supreme Court held that compara-
tive income or economic disparity is not a permissible basis for determining
custody. Id. at 493. It is apparent that the limitations set forth in Burchard
are not consistently followed. An examination of move-away custody cases
reveals that economic concerns and income are factors the court frequently con-
siders quite seriously. See discussion infra part II.C.5. One parent's higher in-
come typically translates into more discretionary income that can be used for a
child's benefit. Money is needed for food, suitable housing, clothing, health
care, educational purposes, extracurricular activities, etc. These factors are
routinely addressed by the trial courts; therefore, money is necessarily an im-
portant issue. See discussion infra part II.C.5. Consequently, the limitations
posed by the Burchard holding are not absolute and are often overlooked.
197. In re Marriage of Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 253 (Ct. App. 1986). This
view of relocation for legitimate employment reasons is an influential justifica-
tion for permitting the desired move as shown by the court's holding in Rosson.
There, the court held, "where a parent providing the primary residence for chil-
dren decides, for legitimate job-related reasons, to move.., this can be found to
constitute a persuasive showing of changed circumstances affecting the chil-
dren justifying modification of a custody order." Id.
198. Id. at 259. The court in Rosson further stated that the child's prefer-
ence should be assigned a greater role in modification proceedings than in ini-
tial custody determinations. Id. at 257. In this case, the ten- and thirteen-year
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linked to the move-away parent's continuing financial posi-
tion, 199 as well as the parent's psychological well-being and
respect in the employment community.
6. Assigning Believability to the Child's Preferences
When appropriate, the court will consider the child's
preferences regarding relocation.2 °0 It is statutorily required
that "[i]f a child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so
as to form an intelligent preference as to custody, the court
shall consider and give due weight to the wishes of the child
in making an award of custody or modification thereof."2 1
As demonstrated in Rosson, in determining whether the
child is capable of expressing a helpful preference, the court's
focus is not as much upon the child's age as the child's matur-
ity level. The Rosson court found that "[m]aturity is not mea-
sured by chronological age,"20 2 and based its determination
upon factors such as "sincerity," "bearing," and "degree of ma-
turity."20 3 Typically, with children between the ages of ten
and thirteen, one of the trial court's functions is to determine
the validity of their expressed preferences, if possible.20 4
In Rosson, the court used an in-chambers procedure be-
cause it avoided "to the greatest extent possible placing the
children in a position of having to choose between their par-
ents."20 5 While asking a child what she or he prefers would
ostensibly be the most straightforward method by which to
identify the arrangement the child is most comfortable with,
this approach is not always the most effective. Even if the
child is deemed of sufficient maturity to express a valid pref-
erence, the child may fear giving his or her choice because
doing so might anger the parent not selected. Moreover, the
child's expressed preference may be tainted if it is motivated
by feelings of guilt, anger or resentment toward one parent,
or by the fear of beginning life in a new environment. Fur-
thermore, the child may choose not to express a preference
old children met the statutory measure, which was determined from the chil-
dren's testimony given in the judge's chambers. Id. at 254.
199. See supra note 196.
200. In re Marriage of Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 256 (Ct. App. 1986).
201. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3042 (West 1994).
202. Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 255 n.5.
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because she or he does not want to choose sides or dreads the
repercussions of doing so. 2
0 6
Thus, while it is statutorily required that the child's pref-
erence be given weight if she or he is of sufficient maturity to
express a valid choice, and while it would be helpful for the
court to have such information available in making its deter-
mination, the court cannot routinely expect accurate informa-
tion. Too many potential interferences could either prevent
the child from interjecting his or her preferences, or taint the
truthfulness of such statements.2 ° v
7. Taking into Consideration the Expense,
Inconvenience, and Distance of Travel
Travel expenses incurred by relocation are often among
the factors considered.2 °8 A proposed move which increases
the distance between the custodial and noncustodial parents
generally increases travel costs, time and inconvenience of
travel.
With respect to travel expenses, the court typically fo-
cuses on whether the resulting increase in costs caused by
relocation will prevent the noncustodial parent from exercis-
ing his visitation rights.20 9 As some increase in travel ex-
penses is to be expected, an increase in expenses is not suffi-
cient by itself to warrant denial of a desired move. The
court's focus appears to be on the magnitude of the increase.
The court's primary concern, as illustrated in Ciga-
novich, reveals that "[r]egardless of the mother's good or ill
motives, the father's inability to spend time and money on
206. Bulow & Gellman, supra note 13, at 956.
207. Even though the children's expressed preferences in Rosson proved to
be one of the most critical and determinative factors in the case's outcome, this
degree of persuasiveness is not frequent. In re Marriage of Rosson, 224 Cal.
Rptr. 250, 255 (Ct. App. 1986).
208. See generally In re Marriage of Roe, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 358 (Ct. App.
1993), review granted and cause transferred sub nom. by In re Marriage of Clin-
ton H.R., 856 P.2d 1131 (Cal. 1993), aff'd sub nom., In re Marriage of Roe, 23
Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the parties were sufficiently
affluent to be able to afford the expense of transporting the child back and forth
between Alabama and California); In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr.
840, 843 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the parties did not have the financial
capacity to ensure contact between the father and the children); In re Marriage
of Ciganovich, 132 Cal. Rptr. 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1976) ("the father's inability to
spend time and money on travel may effectively damage or destroy his legiti-
mate paternal aspirations.").
209. See cases cited supra note 208.
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travel may effectively damage or destroy his legitimate pater-
nal aspirations."21 ° Thus, if the distance created by the move
renders visitation virtually impossible as a result of in-
creased expenses and time-consuming travel, the court will
consider this situation seriously. If visitation rights can no
longer be exercised, the resulting lack of contact both coun-
teracts the public policy of frequent and continual contact be-
tween the child and the noncustodial parent 211 and infringes
upon the noncustodial parent's right to visit with the child.21 2
The court's concern with travel expenses is demonstrated
in In re Marriage of Carlson,213 where the custodial mother
was not permitted to relocate to Pennsylvania from Califor-
nia with the couple's two minor children.21 4 Although many
factors were addressed by the trial court in arriving at this
decision, travel expenses were cited as a significant consider-
ation.21 5 The court found that "both parents lacked the finan-
cial wherewithal to sustain a long-distance relationship be-
tween the children and their father of the substance they
presently enjoyed."216 This statement indicates that the
court was concerned with the probable interference of the
noncustodial parent's visitation rights, as well as disruption
of the existing stable and workable custody arrangement that
would ensue from the move.
Thus, while an increase in travel expenses and inconven-
ience alone may not compel the court to deny a proposed relo-
cation, the court will consider such a factor in conjunction
with other factors, as they may indirectly affect the child's
best interests and welfare.
In addition to examining the expenses incurred by trav-
eling, the court may take notice of the inconvenience caused
by travel distance. First, an increase in travel distance may
lead to an interference with the noncustodial parent's "practi-
cal ability"2 1 7 to exercise visitation rights. The increased
time required to travel will detract from the noncustodial
parent's time available to spend with the children and is
210. Ciganovich, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
211. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (West 1994).
212. Id. § 3100.
213. 280 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1991).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 845.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 842.
352 [Vol. 35
MOVE-AWAY CUSTODY DISPUTES
likely to produce greater inconvenience overall. The noncus-
todial parent may find that the increase in travel time cre-
ated by the proposed relocation would result in less quality
time to spend with his children. Second, the greater travel
distance resulting from relocation will most likely increase
travel expenses.218
In Carlson, for example, the trial court found the parents
lacked the "financial wherewithal"219 to preserve continuing
visitation and that the decrease in contact between the father
and the children would not be a "healthy environment for the
minor children to be raised in."220 The court concluded that
"a noncustodial parent's loss of the practical ability to exer-
cise visitation is relevant in deciding whether a custodial par-
ent should be restrained from moving a child to a different
geographical area."221 Consequently, the mother's proposed
relocation was denied.222 Thus, when an increase in travel
expenses and distance imposes undue hardship on the non-
custodial parent, the court will list this factor as a reason for
restricting a desired move.
8. Striving Toward a "New Start" and the Problem
with Speculative Justifications
Finally, a reason frequently cited as justification for a
proposed move is the custodial parent's desire to make a new
start, or to begin a new life altogether after divorce. Often,
relocation is viewed as integral to the achievement of this
goal, as it may allow the mother to move near family,223 seek
employment or enable her new spouse to obtain work,224 con-
218. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
219. In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 840, 843 (Ct. App. 1991).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 842.
222. Id. In contrast, in Rosson, a case in which the proposed move was per-
mitted, the fact that the move was a comparably short distance to that proposed
in Carlson likely factored into the court's holding. In re Marriage of Rosson,
224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 254 (Ct. App. 1986). In Rosson, the custodial mother wished
to move from Napa to San Francisco, an intrastate rather than interstate relo-
cation, as was the situation in Carlson. Id. Similarly, the mother was permit-
ted to relocate in Fingert where the proposed move was from Ventura County to
San Mateo, also an intrastate transition. In re Marriage of Fingert, 271 Cal.
Rptr. 389, 390 (Ct. App. 1990).
223. See, e.g., Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
224. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Roe, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 353 (Ct. App.
1993), review granted and cause transferred sub nom. by In re Marriage of Clin-
ton H.R., 856 P.2d 1131 (Cal. 1993), aff'd sub nom., In re Marriage of Roe, 23
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225tinue her education, or move somewhere that she will not
be confronted with or be reminded of her ex-spouse. 2 26 For
example, the custodial mother may desire to relocate for
safety reasons, such as putting distance between herself and
an abusive former husband.227
While the court will acknowledge and listen to the rea-
sons listed above, their influence is limited. When consider-
ing these justifications, the court will insist that they not be
overly speculative228 and that they be sufficiently compel-
ling.229 As previously mentioned, relocation will most often
not be permitted unless it is imperative, essential, or expedi-
ent.23° Consequently, if the reasons behind a desired move
are too speculative, they will fail to meet the required
showing.
Carlson demonstrates both the problem with asserting
speculative justifications for a desired move and the court's
insistence that the reasons be sufficiently compelling. In
Carlson, the mother wished to move with her children from
California to Pennsylvania as "[sihe desired the emotional
support of her parents, who could also help her care for the
children while she attended college in Pennsylvania."23 1 Fur-
thermore, the "mother aspired to obtain a degree in counsel-
ing, a goal which would take six years to achieve."
232
Although the mother's reasons for the proposed move were
legitimate and in good faith, the trial court did not find them
sufficiently compelling.233 The trial court concluded that the
Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993); In re Marriage of McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d
182, 184 (Ct. App. 1992); Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
225. In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 840, 842 (Ct. App. 1991).
226. See In re Marriage of Ciganovich, 132 Cal. Rptr. 261, 262 (Ct. App.
1976).
227. Id.
228. The fact that speculative claims may limit the court's granting of cus-
tody modification can be inferred from In re Marriage of Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr.
250 (Ct. App. 1986). In this case, the court permitted the custodial parent's
desired relocation because the alleged change of circumstances was "not specu-
lative." Id. at 259.
229. Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
230. Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 489 (Cal. 1986); In re Marriage of
Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 38 (Cal. 1979); In re Marriage of McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d
182, 186 (Ct. App. 1992); Speelman v. Super. Ct., 199 Cal. Rptr. 784, 786 (Ct.
App. 1983).
231. In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 840, 842 (Ct. App. 1991).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 843.
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mother "can obtain the desired education in California and
she has no compelling reason to go to Pennsylvania except for
the emotional support she would derive from contact with her
mother and father."2 34 Consequently, the trial court deter-
mined that it was in the best interests of the children to re-
strict the move so that they could maintain close ties with
both parents.23 5 Thus, it appears from the court's holding in
Carlson that the children's interests will be given priority
consideration while the custodial parent's desire to be with
his or her family for emotional support will be relegated to
secondary importance.23 6
In addition, the court's opinion in Rosson suggests that if
the move-away parent alleges that the move is for the pur-
pose of seeking better employment, or for any other benefit
not yet materialized, problems may surface as to the specula-
tive nature of such assertions.237 Although the court deemed
the mother's reasons behind the proposed move "not specula-
tive"231 in that she had found "a new and better job in San
Francisco,"23 9 the fact that the court addressed this possibil-
ity indicates that it is an issue that will be considered. The
court, therefore, may be skeptical if the move-away parent is
speculating as to the possibility of seeking better employment
as opposed to having a job offer available to accept, or even
highly promising contacts.
9. Constitutional Concerns Surrounding Move-Away
Custody Disputes
Finally, constitutional concerns are an essential consid-
eration in the trial court's analysis and resolution of move-
away custody disputes. The primary issue involved is
whether denial of relocation, in the event that the requisite
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 840, 843 (Ct. App. 1991). Had
the mother asserted a more compelling reason to move to Pennsylvania, such as
an actual job offer or scholarship to a university in that state, the outcome may
have been different. The trial court, however, also found that the parties lacked
the financial resources to maintain a long-distance relationship, and the rela-
tionship between the children and their father would be harmed if visitation
could not be carried out. Id.
237. In re Marriage of Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 259 (Ct. App. 1986). See
also Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
238. Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
239. Id. at 254.
1994] 355
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
showing of a substantial change of circumstances has been
met,24 ° is an infringement of an individual's constitutional
rights of travel and mobility.
The right of travel has long been established as constitu-
tionally protected.241 In Shapiro v. Thompson,2 42 the United
States Supreme Court stated:
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Fed-
eral Union and our constitutional concepts of personal lib-
erty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel
throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhib-
ited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably
burden or restrict this movement.243
This acknowledgment was reaffirmed in In re White:
244
"[T]he right to intrastate travel (which includes in-
tramunicipal travel) is a basic human right protected by the
United States and California Constitutions as a whole. Such
a right is implicit in the concept of a democratic society
"245
Despite the express recognition of the constitutionally
protected right to travel, judicial dissension exists as to the
extent and role of constitutional issues in the context of
move-away custody disputes. At one extreme, some courts
reason that restricting a move by threatening to retract cus-
tody from the custodial parent if that parent decides to move
is a flagrant violation of an individual's constitutional right to
travel.246 In Fingert, the court held:
Courts cannot order individuals to move to and live in a
community not of their choosing. To attempt to do so is
inconsistent with both the federal and California Consti-
tutions. The United States Supreme Court has inferred a
240. See discussion supra part II.B.1.b.
241. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 (1966); Blair W. Hoff-
man, Restrictions on a Parent's Right to Travel in Child Custody Cases: Possible
Constitutional Questions, 6 U.C. DAviS L. REV. 181, 186 (1973). See generally
Paula M. Raines, Joint Custody and the Right to Travel: Legal and Psychologi-
cal Implications, 24 J. FAm. L. 625 (1985); Anne L. Spitzer, Moving and Storage
of Post-Divorce Children: Relocation, the Constitution and the Courts, 1985
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1985).
242. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
243. Id. at 629.
244. 158 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Ct. App. 1979).
245. Id. at 567 (citation omitted). See also People v. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr.
381, 386 (Ct. App. 1983) ("A citizen has a basic constitutional right to intrastate
travel as well as interstate travel.").
246. See In re Marriage of Fingert, 271 Cal. Rptr. 389, 392 (Ct. App. 1990).
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right to travel from various constitutional provisions.
This right also protects the right of individuals to "mi-
grate, resettle, and find a new job."247
At the other end of the spectrum, some courts have held
that constitutional rights are not violated if custody is taken
away when the parent goes through with her desired move.
The rationale behind this viewpoint is that the parent still
remains free to travel and move regardless of whether cus-
tody is taken away. This viewpoint is demonstrated in Mc-
Ginnis, where the court held that the "[mother is free to
travel inter- or intrastate. The issue is whether she can take
the children with her .... A trial court's order denying her
request to remove the children may 'chill' her constitutional
right to travel, but only indirectly."
2 4 8
This viewpoint makes a distinction as to the real issue
present in these situations. Here, the issue posed by move-
away custody cases is not whether a constitutional right to
travel exists, but whether the move-away parent has a right
to take her child with her if the move is realized.249 By re-
phrasing the primary issue in this manner, the court is essen-
tially avoiding the overriding constitutional problem by
recharacterizing the issue as concerning an unrecognized
right, that of traveling with one's child.
Under this framework, the "right" at issue is much less
serious than the protected constitutional right to move and
travel because any alleged right to move with one's child
without jeopardizing custodial arrangements is not constitu-
tionally protected. Hence, the so-called right to move with
one's child, since it is not a protected constitutional right, is
subject to the same overriding policy as all family law ques-
tions: the best interests of the child remains paramount to all
other considerations. 25 0
This viewpoint is illustrated by the court's reasoning in
Carlson, where the court stated that even if denial of reloca-
tion by removal of custody poses a hindrance to travel, such
interference is only indirect and is outweighed by considera-
tions pertaining to the child's best interests.25 ' The court
247. Id. at 392 (citation omitted).
248. In re Marriage of McGinnis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 187 (Ct. App. 1982).
249. Id.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
251. In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 840, 846 (Ct. App. 1991).
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maintained that not permitting the mother to relocate "was
not a direct restriction upon the mother, since it did not pre-
vent her from leaving the state without the children."252 The
court continued: "[a] serious argument can also be made that
the state has a legitimate and necessary interest in the wel-
fare of the child .... ."25 Hence, the court's interest in the
child's welfare overshadows the indirect interference of the
parent's right to travel and move.2 5 4
While constitutional issues remain a consideration in a
judicial determination as to whether relocation should be per-
mitted, it appears that, typically, they do not prevent a judge
from making a ruling that effectively restricts relocation.
The general rule, therefore, is that restricting relocation does
not constitute an infringement of an individual's right to
travel because even if relocation is not allowed the parent can
still travel freely-as long as such travel is without the
children.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Multi-Factor Analysis: Looking at the Factors of Each
Case as Interactive
The unique factors of each move-away case generally
work in combination to persuade a judge to permit or deny a
proposed relocation. An examination of recent California
move-away custody cases reveals that rarely, if at all, will one
factor be determinative in resolving a dispute. Typically, a
judge will look at the variety of factors and circumstances
posed by each case. These factors can be perceived as pros
and cons for permitting or denying a desired move. Conse-
quently, while one or two factors may be more critical and
therefore more influential than other factors, the final out-
come is most likely attributable to the interplay of multiple
factors.
252. Id. at 846 (emphasis added).
253. Id.
254. See In re Marriage of Ciganovich, 132 Cal. Rptr. 261, 264 (Ct. App.
1976) ("The court referred to the mother's constitutional right of 'freedom of
movement' but failed to recognize the well-established rule that removal of the
children with the objective of frustrating visitation rights offends the court
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In In re Marriage of Rosson,2 5 for example, one of the
most critical factors was the child's strong preference against
relocation.25 6 However, this was not the only factor the court
addressed in its decision to award the children's primary cus-
tody to the father following the mother's relocation. In addi-
tion to the persuasive testimony of the child,257 the court also
considered the nature and amount of contact between the
children and both parents, as well as the children's ties to the
community in which they were raised.258 Both parents were
deemed "excellent parents,"259 which meant that regardless
of whether the move was permitted, the children would re-
side with a suitable parent. Furthermore, common sense
reveals that as the age of the children involved increases, so
will the difficulty of adjustment to a new school and peer
group. 260 The age of the children involved is a factor inher-
ently linked to the degree of the children's entrenchment
within their residential community.
In light of the children's preferences, their degree of ma-
turity, and the fact that their academic, athletic, social, and
religious activities remained in their current community,261
the mother's interests were subsumed by the best interests of
the children.262 Even though the court in Rosson considered
the mother's competing interests-the fact that she had a
new and better job waiting for her in the area to which she
wished to move26 3-the court opted to restrict the mother
from relocating the children from Napa to San Francisco.
Thus, it becomes evident that the outcome in Rosson was not
determined by one isolated factor, but instead was a product
of the interplay of the multiple factors and circumstances sur-
rounding the particular dispute.
255. 224 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Ct. App. 1986).
256. Id. at 255.
257. The child articulated that he wished to stay in Napa because he felt
"comfortable" there and his "friends and [his] school" were in Napa. Id. The
child had lived in Napa all his life and explained: "[M]oving to [San Francisco]
would be like putting me in a cage." Id.
258. Id. at 259.
259. Id. at 255.
260. At the ages of 13 and 10, the children in Rosson were firmly rooted in
their current location. In re Marriage of Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 254 (Ct.
App. 1986).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 253.
263. Id. at 254.
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Similarly, the court in In re Marriage of Roe264 did not
rely on one predominant factor in permitting the mother to
relocate from California to Alabama. Specifically, the court
looked to the mother's admirable role as an active parent, the
father's continuing anger and animosity, and the fact that the
purpose of the move was to enable the mother's new spouse to
accept a job after a nine-month period of unemployment. 26 5
The court assessed the impact of the advantages and disad-
vantages of the relocation as a whole and made its ultimate
decision with the goal of furthering the best interests of the
child.
A final example of the court's tendency to examine a com-
bination of significant factors, rather than each factor in a
vacuum, is the move-away custody dispute presented in In re
Marriage of Carlson.266 In that case, the court considered the
custodial mother's motives for the move from California to
Pennsylvania-to be with her family and continue her educa-
tion, the positive nature of the child's relationship with both
parents, and the fact that the parents did not have sufficient
financial resources to maintain a long-distance visitation
arrangement.2 67
Thus, it is evident that during the complex process of
resolving move-away custody disputes, a trial court judge will
examine and evaluate all relevant factors as a combination of
elements, not as isolated issues. The final determination is a
product of the interaction of various factors, because these
factors as a whole indicate whether the proposed relocation
would be in the best interests of the child.
B. Standard of Review
As previously discussed, the circumstances surrounding
each move-away custody dispute are vital to its final out-
come. 2 68 In the case-by-case treatment of move-away dis-
putes, the trial court judge is empowered to consider all rele-
vant facts in making a custody determination with the
264. In re Marriage of Roe, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352 (Ct. App. 1993), review
granted and cause transferred sub nom. by In re Marriage of Clinton H.R., 856
P.2d 1131 (Cal. 1993), aff'd sub nom., In re Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d
295 (Ct. App. 1993).
265. Id. at 353.
266. 280 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1991).
267. Id. at 843.
268. See discussion supra parts II.B.2, III.A.
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"widest discretion."269 As a result of this broad discretion,
the standard of review for move-away custody cases favors
protecting the trial judge's decision. The general rule states
that "[t]he standards of appellate review of custody and visi-
tation orders are settled. Reversal is justified only for abuse
of discretion."21
0
The precise "test" the judge must adhere to in order to
remain within the wide boundaries of his or her discretion is
set forth in Carlson: "The reviewing court must consider all
the evidence, draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all
evidentiary conflicts, in a light most favorable to the trial
court's ruling."271 The reviewing court determines whether
any rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial court
order advanced the best interests of the child.272 This test
focuses on what the trier of fact "could conclude," as opposed
to the deductions the judge actually made. 273 This suggests
that a ruling of abuse of discretion is rare because specula-
tion as to the reasoning behind the judge's decision is
permissible.274
Thus, this standard of review indicates that the judge's
wide discretion is virtually unfettered; so long as the judge
considers the evidence before him or her in a rational man-
ner, the custody decision will not be overturned for an abuse
of discretion.
C. Uncurbed Discretion: The Need for Legislation
The fact that a family court judge's discretion is virtually
unrestrained in the area of move-away custody disputes indi-
269. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3040(b) (West 1994).
270. Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (citation omitted). See also Gudelj v.
Gudeb, 259 P.2d 656, 660 (Cal. 1953); Clarke v. Clarke, 217 P.2d 401, 402 (Cal.
1950); In re Marriage of Roe, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 354 (Ct. App. 1993), review
granted and cause transferred sub norn. by In re Marriage of Clinton H.R., 856
P.2d 1131 (Cal. 1993), aff'd sub nom., In re Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d
295 (Ct. App. 1993); In re Marriage of Birnbaum, 260 Cal. Rptr. 210, 216-17 (Ct.
App. 1989).
271. Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (citation omitted).
272. Id. (citation omitted). See also Roe, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 352.
273. In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 840, 845 (Ct. App. 1991) (em-
phasis added).
274. The court in Roe set forth a discretionary test similar to that developed
in Carlson, stating that whether a custody determination permitting relocation
is in the best interests of the child is dependent upon whether the move was
supported by evidence that would indicate the court rationally exercised its dis-
cretion. Roe, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 355 (citation omitted).
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cates a dire need for control and uniformity in the realm of
judicial administration. Legislation is needed because the
best-interests-of-the-child standard and the current case-by-
case method by which to resolve move-away cases is too flexi-
ble and permissive.2 75 With no framework to guide a judge in
his or her custody decision, the outcome of such cases is
highly unpredictable. Furthermore, by virtue of the fact that
judges are given the "widest discretion"276 in making custody
determinations, there exists too much leeway for individual
bias and value judgments.277
Thus, there is a pressing need for a substantive legisla-
tive framework to direct judges in resolving move-away cases
in a predictable, uniform, and consistent manner which will
produce equitable results. This is crucial not only to protect
the parties involved in such cases, but also to promote judi-
cial economy. Furthermore, legislation to guide judges in the
resolution of move-away dilemmas will further guarantee the
implementation of important policy objectives, such as pro-
moting the best interests of the child.278
While each move-away case is unique, a flexible legisla-
tive framework would allow the court to consider each case's
individual attributes. Legislation need not be so rigid that it
275. Recently, California Senator Diane E. Watson authored Senate Bill
1350, last amended in Senate on March 21, 1994, designed to replace Senate
Bill 1159 (1993) which died in committee. Senate Bill 1350 ("SB 1350") was
sent to interim study in August, 1994. Support for Watson's legislative propo-
sal has not yet reached its full potential, however, as SB 1350 died in commit-
tee. A new proposal may be introduced in 1995.
Senate Bill 1350 was designed to amend sections 3004, 3020, 3024, 3040,
and 3086 of the California Family Code. According to the Legislative Counsel's
Digest addressing SB 1350, this bill "would provide that a desire on the part of
either parent to relocate shall not by itself constitute a sufficient basis for an
initial decision to award or allocate custody, nor for a change in custody." S.
1350, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Senate Bill 1350 granted the custodial par-
ent the right to determine the child's residence and shifted the court's focus
from "frequent" contact to "regular" contact. In essence, SB 1350 modernizes
and restates California Family Code section 7501 which empowers the custodial
parent to relocate more freely than is permitted today. See also infra note 278
and accompanying text.
276. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3040(b) (West 1994).
277. See supra note 16.
278. Senate Bill 1350 was designed to achieve these objectives and func-
tioned to shift the burden of proof onto the parent opposing relocation. More
specifically, SB 1350 would have provided "that the noncustodial parent bears
the burden of proving a proposed change of residence is 1) being undertaken to
frustrate the noncustodial parent's visitation rights or 2) is not in the best inter-
ests of the child." ROBERTI, supra note 3, at 7.
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cannot account for the distinctiveness of each case. Instead,
this comment suggests a legislative framework that focuses
on addressing the unique characteristics of each case rather
than ignoring them and still provides guidelines that will
promote predictability and uniformity.
The premise of this comment's proposal is that legisla-
tion in the area of move-away custody cases should provide
the court with guidelines for equitable resolution and protect
the parties' interests, rather than rigid statutory principles
aimed at merely processing these cases in the interest of judi-
cial economy. The benefit of flexible legislative guidelines is
that such legislation would focus judicial determination on
resolutions that remain cognizant of the parties and unique
circumstances each move-away case entails and away from
unpredictability and personal value judgments.
The flexible framework proposed in this comment is
based on the approach utilized in California Family Code sec-
tion 4320, which guides the determination of spousal sup-
port.279 The framework of section 4320 is ideal in that it lists
a series of ten factors the court shall consider in making a
spousal support award. By providing ten factors the court
must evaluate, section 4320 guides the court's focus, yet al-
lows for the judge to determine the strength of each factor
and the role it should play. The tenth factor is a "catch-all"
provision in that it allows the court to consider "[a]ny other
factors it deems just and equitable."2 0 This catch-all provi-
sion is important in that it allows any relevant factor or fac-
tors not included in the list of typical factors to be considered
if doing so would be necessary for an equitable decision.
Therefore, the structure of California Family Code sec-
tion 4320 is incorporated into this comment's legislative pro-
posal because it provides a list of factors the court shall con-
sider, yet remains flexible enough to allow for any unique and
unanticipated circumstances.
IV. PROPOSAL: SUGGESTED LEGISLATION FOR MovE-AwAY
CUSTODY DISPUTES
The proposed legislative framework provides a set of ru-
dimentary guidelines to assist the court in resolving move-
279. CAL. FAm. CODE § 4320 (West 1994).
280. Id. § 4320(j).
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away custody disputes in a uniform, predictable, and flexible
manner:
(A) The Legislature finds and declares that it is the pub-
lic policy of this state to assure minor children of frequent
and continuing contact with both parents after the parents
have separated or dissolved their marriage, and to encourage
parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rear-
ing in order to effect this policy, except where that contact
would not be in the best interest of the child.28 '
In any proceeding where the custody of a minor child in a
relocation dispute is at issue, during the pendency of the pro-
ceeding or at any time thereafter, the court shall make such
order for the custody of the child as may seem necessary and
proper.
(B) In making an award of custody or modifying visita-
tion rights in any relocation dispute, the court shall consider
all of the following needs and circumstances of the child or
children involved:
(1) The best interest of the child, taking into account
all of the following:2 2
(a) The health, safety, and welfare of the
child.283
(b) Any history of abuse by one parent against
the child or against the other parent.28 4
(c) The nature and amount of contact with both
parents prior to relocation.285
(2) If a child is of sufficient maturity and capacity to
reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody,
the court shall consider and give due weight to the wishes of
281. This language is drawn directly from California Family Code section
3020. The role of this language in this legislative proposal is to ensure that the
public policy considerations of the best interests of the child are implemented
and protected.
282. These considerations correspond directly to the section of this comment
dealing with policy considerations. See discussion supra parts II.B.1, II.C.2.
283. This language is drawn directly from California Family Code section
3011(a).
284. This language is drawn directly from California Family Code section
3011(b). For the purposes of this comment and in the interest of brevity, addi-
tional language in this section has been left out.
285. These considerations correspond to the section of this comment dealing
with parental roles and relationships. See discussion supra part II.C.2.
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the child in making an award of custody or modification
thereof in a relocation dispute.28 6
(3) The extent to which the child is attached to or
involved in his or her community surroundings, in light of ac-
ademic, extracurricular, social, athletic, religious, or other
activities.28
7
(C) In making an award of custody in any relocation dis-
pute, the court shall also consider all of the following circum-
stances of the respective parties:
(1) The alleged needs or justifications offered by the
move-away custodial parent in support of the desired
relocation.
(2) The extent to which the custodial parent's de-
sired relocation is prompted by, or based upon, economic fac-
tors, such as, but not limited to, employment opportunities,
housing, education, and the cost of living.28 8
(3) The noncustodial parent's right to and interest in
exercising granted visitation rights, as well as the cost, dis-
tance and inconvenience of travel that would ensue from
relocation.28 9
(4) Any other factors which it deems just and equita-
ble290 and related to the best interests of the child.
V. CONCLUSION
The current case-by-case treatment of move-away cus-
tody disputes in California reveals the dire need for legisla-
tive control.291 With travel and relocation becoming easier
and more common than in the past and with more women
engaged in the work force, move-away custody cases will in-
evitably become an even more pressing and prevalent prob-
lem. Consequently, in the interests of lending guidance and
clarity to the judicial resolution of move-away custody dis-
286. This language is based on California Family Code section 3020. See dis-
cussion supra part II.C.6.
287. These considerations correspond to the section of this comment examin-
ing the significance of the child's community ties. See discussion supra part
II.C.3.
288. See discussion supra part II.C.5.
289. This provision is based on the issues presented in the sections that ad-
dress visitation rights. See discussion supra parts II.C.4, 7.
290. This "catch-all" provision is drawn from California Family Code section
4320(a)(10).
291. See supra note 275.
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putes and of keeping judicial discretion in check, it is neces-
sary that legislation be developed to guide the resolution of
move-away dilemmas.
Although this subject matter remains difficult to legis-
late in that each dispute is unique and highly individualized,
this comment suggests a way in which legislation can achieve
the desired result without overlooking the characteristics of
each dispute. The factors the court typically examines in
move-away cases have been synthesized in this proposal to
provide a flexible framework of guidelines the court should
consider when resolving such disputes. As a result, the pro-
posal suggests a way in which to reform case-by-case analysis
into a controllable process that acknowledges the varying in-
terests and needs of the parties involved and furthers the
public policy goal of promoting the best interests of the child,
while striving for judicial economy and uniformity.
Kimberly K. Holtz
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